Hedge Funds in
Corporate Governance and Corporate Control
MARCEL KAHAN
New York University - School of Law
EDWARD B. ROCK
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Abstract:
Hedge funds have become critical players in both corporate governance and corporate control. In this article, we document and examine the nature of hedge fund activism, how and why it differs from activism by traditional institutional investors, and its implications for corporate governance and regulatory reform. We argue that hedge fund activism differs from activism by traditional institutions in several ways: it is directed at significant changes in individual companies (rather than small, systemic changes), it entails higher costs, and it is strategic and ex ante (rather than intermittent and ex post). The reasons for these differences may lie in the incentive structures of hedge fund managers as well as in the fact that traditional institutions face regulatory barriers, political constraints, or conflicts of interest that make activism less profitable than it is for hedge funds. But the differences may also be due to the fact that traditional institutions pursue a diversification strategy that is difficult to combine with strategic activism.
Although hedge funds hold great promise as active shareholders, their intense involvement in corporate governance and control also potentially raises two kinds of problems: The interests of hedge funds sometimes diverge from those of their fellow shareholders; and the intensity of hedge fund activism imposes substantial stress that the regulatory system may not be able to withstand. The resulting problems, however, are relatively isolated and narrow, do not broadly undermine the value of hedge fund activism as a whole, and do not warrant major additional regulatory interventions.
The sharpest accusation leveled against activist funds is that activism is designed to achieve a short-term payoff at the expense of long-term profitability. Although we consider this a potentially serious problem that arguably pervades hedge fund activism, we conclude that a sufficient case for legal intervention has not been made. This conclusion results from the uncertainties about whether short-termism is in fact a real problem and how much hedge fund activism is driven by excessive short-termism. But, most importantly, it stems from our view that market forces and adaptive devices taken by companies individually are better designed than regulation to deal with the potential negative effects of hedge fund short-termism while preserving the positive effects of hedge-fund activism.
Un article "Winner 2007" du "The De Brauw Blackstone Westbroek Law Prize",
téléchargeable sur le site de ECGI ( voir 'sites' colonne de droite) ou à cette adresse :
http://ddata.over-blog.com/xxxyyy/0/32/13/25/ssrn-id919881.pdf
par RR
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SOLVENCY II
The Main Changes
Basic design
The first two columns compare the Solvency I and Solvency II regimes in terms of the regulatory requirements. The third column depicts the economic capital model that a firm might use to run the business which is known as the Internal Risk and Capital Requirement (IRCA).
http://www.solvencyii.co.uk/pillars.pdf
Sur le site de l' IUA of London
http://www.solvencyii.co.uk/mainchanges.html
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Board Approves New Audit Standard For Internal Control Over Financial Reporting and, Separately, Recommendations on Inspection Frequency Rule
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Washington, DC, May 24, 2007 – The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board today voted to adopt Auditing Standard No. 5, An Audit of Internal Control Over Financial Reporting That Is Integrated with An Audit of Financial Statements, to replace its previous internal control auditing standard, Auditing Standard No. 2. The Board also adopted the related Rule 3525, Audit Committee Pre-Approval of Non-Audit Services Related to Internal Control Over Financial Reporting, and conforming amendments to certain of the Board’s other auditing standards.
la suite sur le site http://www.pcaobus.org/News_and_Events/News/2007/05-24.aspx
AUDITING STANDARD No. 5 –
AN AUDIT OF INTERNAL CONTROL OVER
FINANCIAL REPORTING THAT IS INTEGRATED
WITH AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
AND RELATED INDEPENDENCE RULE AND
CONFORMING AMENDMENTS
PCAOB Release No. 2007-005
May 24, 2007
PCAOB Rulemaking
Docket Matter No. 021
Un document téléchargeable à cette adresse:
http://www.pcaobus.org/Rules/Docket_021/2007-05-24_Release_No_2007-005.pdf
"Work with others"
H.
PCAOB Release 2007-005
May 24, 2007
Page 12
..."At the same time, the Board agreed with those commenters who suggested that better integration of the audits could be achieved without replacing the existing auditing standard. The Board therefore has decided to retain AU sec. 322 for both audits and incorporate language into Auditing Standard No. 5 that establishes these integration concepts rather than adopt the proposed standard on considering and using the work of others."..
AU Section 322
The Auditor’s Consideration of the
Internal Audit Function in an Audit
of Financial Statements
Thanks to John Walz ( le blog de la SOX )
Un document téléchargeable à cette adresse:
http://ddata.over-blog.com/xxxyyy/0/32/13/25/au-00322.pdf
Famille de fonds de pension,
performance et persistance de la performance
Fabrice HERVÉ
FARGO - Centre de recherche en
Finance, ARchitecture et Gouvernance des Organisations
Cahier du FARGO n° 1060903
Septembre 2006
Résumé :
De plus en plus de fonds de retraite à cotisations définies appartiennent à des familles.
Une famille de fonds comprend tous les fonds gérés par la même société.
Le fait d'appartenir à une famille soulève des interrogations sur l'adéquation entre l'objectif d'un fonds (procurer à ses détenteurs la performance la plus élevée possible) et l'objectif de sa famille (rapporter à la société offrant une gamme de fonds le profit le plus élevé possible). Les grandes familles sont plus à même de manipuler les ressources dont elles disposent et, partant, d'influencer la performance et la persistance de la performance de leurs fonds.
Nous montrons que les fonds appartenant aux plus grandes familles produisent des performances plus stables à moyen terme, mais réalisent des performances similaires à celles de leurs homologues de petites familles et enfin, que les fonds les meilleurs des grandes familles ne voient pas leurs performances persister.
Les implications de ces résultats sont doubles : 1. si les grandes familles semblent posséder les moyens d'assurer une plus grande régularité dans les performances de leurs fonds, ceci ne se fait apparemment pas au détriment de certains de leurs fonds ; autrement dit, les familles de fonds de retraite ne constituent pas des entités coordonnées 2. les actuels cotisants ont intérêt à confier la gestion de leur épargne-retraite à des fonds de grandes familles afin de se voir confronté à un moindre risque de trajectoire.
Un article téléchargeable à cette adresse:
http://ddata.over-blog.com/xxxyyy/0/32/13/25/1060903.pdf
par RR
publié dans :
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IMPLICATION ORGANISATIONNELLE
ET STRUCTURE EN RESEAUX
Caroline VAHE-HENNEQUIN
Université Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne
2003
L'objet de notre étude porte sur un nouveau modèle d'organisation, "post-bureaucratique" et sur l'implication organisationnelle des membres de cette structure. Si la littérature est abondante sur les 2 concepts centraux de notre analyse, la notion de réseau semble néanmoins beaucoup plus difficile à cerner, et des questions restent à l'heure actuelle encore sans réponse : qu'est-ce qu'un réseau ? quelle typologie est-on à même d'en dresser aujourd'hui ?, et surtout, quel impact cette nouvelle forme organisationnelle engendre-t-elle sur la gestion des hommes ? Une certitude émerge néanmoins, le réseau crée de nouveaux liens dans l'organisation et, ne peut survivre sans la coopération et la confiance entre ses membres.
Notre recherche se focalise donc sur l'implication organisationnelle des membres d'un réseau : comment se caractérise t-elle, et quels en sont les principaux attributs et conséquences ?
Un article téléchargeable à cette adresse :
http://ddata.over-blog.com/xxxyyy/0/32/13/25/implication-organisationnelle-structure-en-reseaux-vahe-hennequin.pdf
par RR
publié dans :
Réseaux
0
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